How can a constituency continue to receive targeted benefits even without a representative in the legislature? We provide a theoretical model to demonstrate why constituency groups linked to specific candidates would receive politicized government transfers even when the group loses its representative in the legislature. The model also suggests that the amount of transfers a group with a representative receives is increasing in the probability that the group can secure a legislative seat in next election. We test this claim using the changes in Japanese central-to-municipality transfers after a representative passes away while in office.
Introduction
In a republic constituencies are indirectly represented in the policy making process by their chosen representatives. Representatives help insure that public policies reflect the interests of their constituents. Thus, we would expect that the value of a representative should be most apparent with respect to policies that distribute benefits to specific constituencies, such as targeted government transfers.
In most formal models of distributive politics with multiple districts, constituencies receive benefits because of individual representatives' activities in the legislature (e.g. Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981) .
1 Legislators are usually motivated by some personal interest in delivering benefits to their constituents, which is often assumed to be related to their desires to be re-elected. To our knowledge existing theories of distributive politics which include legislators presume that constituencies will receive government transfers because they are represented in the legislature.
A substantial empirical literature attempts to identify the influence of representatives in distributive politics. When political parties are not well organized and elections explicitly link candidates to specific constituencies, these studies find that the characteristics of representatives are correlated with how specific types of transfers are distributed. 2 However, the evidence for this correlation is often complex and true only given certain conditions regarding either the characteristics of the legislators or the types of transfers. A notable set of articles on distributive politics in the U.S. finds little correlation between the characteristics of representatives and government transfers.
3 Despite this lack of clear empirical evidence, the popular perception continues to be that individual legislators influence the distribution 1 See Shepsle and Weingast (1994) for a review of the development of some of the theoretical literature on distributive politics.
2 In the U.S. the correlations appear to be stronger for more specific types of transfers such as ear marks than for aggregate levels of federal spending (e.g. Lee, 2003; Levitt and Poterba, 1999; Stein and Bickers, 1995) . There is evidence that individual legislators in other candidate-centered democracies influence government transfers (e.g. Golden and Picci, 2007; Crisp and Ingall, 2002) .
3 In reviewing the literature on the distribution of public expenditures in the U.S., Levitt and Snyder (1995, p. 961) write, "Most of the evidence supports the "recruitment" hypothesis, in which representatives are attracted to committees whose activities are important to their district. There is far less evidence that committee membership allows representatives to increase the total amount of resources directed to their district (Ray 1982 is an exception). The relationship between congressional seniority and federal outlays also appears to be weak." of targeted government benefits for their constituents. In this paper we address the simple question: Why would a constituency continue to receive targeted benefits even without a representative in the legislature? The answer we propose focuses on the implicit bargaining power of constituencies. In particular, legislators have an incentive to allocate transfers to constituency groups irrespective of whether the group has a representative. The constituency groups that receive transfers are those which are cohesive and large enough to deliver a seat in future elections. Since we assume that the majority party distributes a larger share of the government budget than the minority party, legislators seeking to be part of the majority party have an incentive to make sure that constituency groups in their party do not withhold their support in a future election.
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The first half of the paper elaborates the logic of this intuition through a formal model of legislative bargaining over distributive politics. Although there are a large number of theoretical models addressing the distribution of public expenditures, to our knowledge this is the first paper to incorporate constituency groups and elections directly into a model of bargaining over distributive goods. In the model there are multiple districts, which may be multi-member. Candidates and legislators belong to one of two political parties.
6 Each candidate and sitting legislator is associated with a constituency group. The group controls a block of votes that may support a particular candidate. There is some uncertainty about 4 One potential explanation of why the correlation may appear to be weak is that certain targeted goods may be part of a log-roll, so legislators may still be obtaining certain types of benefits to their constituents by forgoing other types of benefits or by distributing the benefits more widely (e.g. Evans, 2004) .
5 Of course an alternative explanation is that transfers may have significant "spill-over" effects across offices. We are focusing on targeted benefits that we believe do not exhibit such effects.
6 This can also be thought of as belonging to either the majority or minority coalition.
the ability of each group to deliver an electoral victory, since electoral outcomes also depend on a nationwide partisan tide.
There is a fixed amount of government funds which can be transferred to specific groups.
Both political parties bargain over the distribution of these funds under majority rule, but (implicitly assuming "strong" parties) the majority party is in control of a larger share of the funds over which its members bargain. At the bargaining stage, legislators are identical in ability and voting power. We therefore invoke existing bargaining models to assume that each legislator within a party expects to receive transfers with the same ex ante expected value. After the transfers are allocated there is an election.
Constituency groups tie the parties' office-holding preferences with their legislators' transfer strategies. The groups can choose whether to support their candidate based on the amount of transfers. In particular, if a legislator "disappears" then the group can bargain with the party for a "set-aside" of transfers, in return for continued electoral support. The party, which is concerned with maximizing its future seat share, can then propose a set-aside of transfers for the group. The set-aside amount must be supported by a majority of party members. In equilibrium, it must also take into account the group's bargaining power, which is driven by how much the group could affect whether the party attains a majority in the next election. After the set-aside is determined, legislators then bargain over the remaining transfers.
The key result of the model is that under "normal" circumstances, a constituency group that "loses" its legislative representative will see its transfers decline in the probability that it cannot secure a legislative seat in the next election. Losing the support of a large group results in the loss of a large number of voters. This in turn makes a legislative majority and the pork benefits thereof more difficult to achieve. The loss of the support of a small group matters less to a party's membership, since that support may be unnecessary for achieving a majority.
The second half of the paper presents some empirical evidence for an association between loss of representatives, the probability that groups backing the representative can secure a seat in the next election, and the distribution of targeted transfers. As in Hirano (2006b) we exploit the large number of legislators who pass away while in office and are not necessarily replaced. However, we incorporate a measure of the strength of constituency groups supporting the deceased representative. As we discuss, these groups tend to be highly organized and survive past the life of individual candidates.
We find that transfers to constituency groups which are more likely to secure a seat in future elections are less affected by the passing away of the group's representative than groups which are less likely to secure a seat in future elections. This is consistent with the second intuition from the model and suggests that Japanese legislators are willing to forgo benefits to their own "core" areas in order to satisfy constituency groups which have a reasonable claim to providing "swing" seats in the next election. 
The Model
Our model combines legislation in a divide-the-dollar environment over two periods, indexed by t. Between the periods there is a partisan election. There are I ≥ 1 (odd) electoral districts. To incorporate the possibility of multiple-member districts, there are J ≥ 1 (odd) legislators elected in each district. Each legislator belongs to one of two parties, denoted P 1 and P 2 . We assume that IJ ≥ 3 and let µ = (IJ + 1)/2 denote the size of the smallest majority. Additionally, let m t p denote the number of party P p representatives in the legislature at the beginning of period t.
In each period, the main outcome of interest is the division of public funds, which depends on the distribution of seats in the legislature. The size of the "pie" to be distributed in period t is given by π(µ
, where µ t p is the proportion of seats held by party p at the legislative bargaining stage in period t. The function r : [0, 1] → + maps a party's size to a "bonus" that can be distributed among its legislators. We assume that r(µ t p ) = 0 for µ t p ≤ 1/2, and that r(µ t p ) is weakly concave and weakly increasing. Thus, only one party's members can enjoy the bonus, which follows from majority status and has a per capita value that is non-decreasing in the party's size.
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The period t policy outcome is represented by the I × J matrix x t , where element x t ij is the allocation to the j-th legislator in district i and
As is standard in models of legislative bargaining, each legislator maximizes her total allocation of transfers. Following the standard in models of political competition, parties maximize the number of seats won.
The key feature of the model is that each legislator may become incapable of participating in the legislative process. This may be due to death or an illness that prevents participation until after the next election. At the beginning of period 1, one legislator is chosen randomly from each party, according to any distribution over party members. With probability γ > 0, that legislator is incapacitated for the session. No incapacitation takes place in period 2.
In each period, legislators who are present in the legislature (i.e., not incapacitated) participate in a bargaining process over the feasible allocations of the pie. Each party P p has exclusive rights to bargain over its share r(µ t p ) of π(µ t 1 , µ t 2 ). The remaining "dollar," which cannot be appropriated by a single party due to technological constraints, weaker discipline, or institutional constraints, is allocated to each party on a proportional basis for their internal bargaining process. In effect, each party specifies its ex ante expected portion µ t p + r(µ t p ) of the public budget independently. We are agnostic about the details of the bargaining game within each party, simply because many bargaining games predict equal ex ante expected payoffs in games where all players have equal voting weight.
9 This is true of the noncooperative models of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Morelli (1999) , and also of power indices based on cooperative game theory, such as Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1968) . Thus when all legislators 8 One interpretation of the bonus r(·) is that it represents geographic spillovers in government spending that can be better captured by constituents of large majority parties. Constituents of such a party are more likely to be geographically continuous. Thus larger coalitions may enlarge the set of projects that can be feasibly proposed. This is especially relevant with multi-member districts, where legislators might have more difficulty excluding non-party members.
9 As a result, the bargaining process here is equivalent to one in which each party P p bargains over its exclusive share r(µ t p ), and the entire legislature bargains over the remaining dollar.
are present, the bargaining process implies an ex ante expected period t transfer level of:
Each party can respond to an incapacitation by bargaining with its members over the division of pork. In particular, a party can propose a "set-aside" allocation to its members.
This allocation is represented by the I × J matrix y p and may promise a positive level of funding to any constituency, including that of an incapacitated legislator. This proposal is then voted on against the status quo set-aside of 0 by all party members according to majority rule; thus, a party cannot impose this set-aside on its members. If its set-aside allocation totaling y p = i j y pij passes, then party P p 's allocation of µ t p + r(µ t p ) is reduced by y p and the expected bargaining outcomes in (1) are reduced accordingly. Obviously, any set-asides must satisfy the budget constraint x 1 ≥ y 1 + y 2 .
Legislators and parties are linked to their constituencies by an election that takes place between policy-making periods. In the election, each party runs J election candidates in each district. These candidates include all incumbents as well as possible replacements for opposition legislators and incapacitated legislators. Denote by C pij the j-th party P p candidate in district i. In each district i, candidates compete over a continuum of nonstrategic voters of measure 1.
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Each candidate's electoral support is determined in large part by a candidate-centered interest group. To represent such groups, each candidate is associated exogenously with a player G pij and a portion ρ pij of district i's voters. A group that was associated with an incapacitated legislator is simply associated with that party's replacement candidate for that legislator. We assume that ρ pij > 0 and p i j ρ pij < 1, and without loss of generality, Each group can affect its legislator's behavior through its decision over whether to sup-port its candidate. The form of this strategy depends on whether a group's legislator is incapacitated. When its legislator is not incapacitated, the group simply chooses g pij at the election stage. If the group supports its candidate (g pij = 1), then candidate C pij receives the votes of all ρ pij of its associated members. If the group does not support its candidate (g pij = 0), then some proportion β of its associated members divide their votes evenly among party P p 's candidates, while proportion 1 − β do not vote. While we do not model a spatial dimension to voter choices, each group's voters might plausibly represent ideologically homogeneous citizens who will either vote for their preferred party's candidate or stay home.
Thus the group's role is a combination of motivating turnout and coordinating votes in favor of its candidate.
When its legislator is incapacitated, a group can bargain with its party. We implement this in the simplest possible way by allowing G pij to pre-commit credibly to a support strategy. Thus g pij (x 1 pij ) becomes a "contract" that is announced prior to the realization of x 1 . In equilibrium, this contract becomes the basis for the party's set-aside allocation y p .
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In addition to group support, vote totals are determined by a random partisan tide τ ∈ [0, 1], where τ is distributed according to some continuous cdf F (τ ). In district i, the tide assigns proportion τ ρ 0 i + j β(1 − g 1ij )ρ 1ij of voters evenly across party P 1 's candidates. Similarly, a proportion (1 − τ )ρ 0 i + j β(1 − g 2ij ))ρ 2ij is assigned evenly amongst P 2 's candidates. Each district then sends its top J vote-getters to the period 2 legislature.
The game begins with an initial configuration of legislators representing each district.
For consistency with the election model, we assume that incumbents and replacements for incapacitated legislators are associated with having strictly larger support groups (ρ pij ) than non-incumbents. The model then proceeds as follows.
1 Incapacitation. In each party, Nature chooses one legislator according to some distribution.
11 This raises the question of why groups do not bargain with a party when their legislators are not incapacitated. One answer is that this would typically result in lower levels of transfers. Another is that in a repeated setting, seat-maximizing parties would have incentives to limit such opportunistic behavior by groups or their legislators. We therefore simplify the model by assuming that groups cannot choose to bargain when their legislators are not incapacitated. The party therefore incorporates repeat play or overlapping generations considerations in a finite-period model. Relatedly, Alesina and Spear (1988) and Harrington (1992) develop models in which parties act as long-term organizations that help politicians commit to policies that are not in their short-term interests but are electorally advantageous.
With probability γ, this legislator is incapacitated.
2 Voting Contracts. For any incapacitated legislator, its group G pij announces g pij (x 1 pij ).
3 Party Allocation. Each party P p with incapacitated legislators proposes a set-aside y p .
Each such allocation is voted against the allocation 0 by party members.
4 Legislative Bargaining 1. In each party, legislators bargain, resulting in x 1 .
5 Elections. Groups associated with non-incapacitated legislators choose support levels g pij .
Nature determines τ and election winners are determined.
6 Legislative Bargaining 2. In each party, legislators bargain, resulting in
This is a game of complete but imperfect information. We derive a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies, which consists of optimal strategies at each information set. Thus,
given the game history at the relevant stage, groups associated with non-incapacitated legislators choose the optimal support level. Parties propose the seat-maximizing set-aside allocations, and groups representing incapacitated legislators announce transfer-maximizing voting contracts. We treat the two legislative bargaining stages as reduced forms in the manner described above and therefore do not derive explicit bargaining strategies.
Main Results
We first develop some notation and terminology for describing electoral outcomes. In any district i, each party P 1 candidate C 1ij 's vote share is:
and likewise, each party P 2 candidate C 2ij 's vote share is:
These expressions imply that in each district i, there exists set of tide cutpoints T i = {τ j i }, which are the minimum values of τ at which exactly j (respectively, J − j) candidates from party P 1 (respectively, P 2 ) are elected when g pij = 1 for all candidates. It will also be convenient to let τ
) is the probability that district i elects at most j party P 1 candidates, or equivalently at least J − j party P 2 candidates. By construction, if candidate C pij is elected, then any candidate C pij must also be elected if j < j and g pij = g pij . However, depending on ρ 0 i , it is possible for the number of electable candidates to be bounded when all groups support their candidates. Thus, T i may contain between up to J interior elements.
Aggregating across all districts, it is straightforward to construct a set of "national" tide cutpoints T = {τ n } at which a total of n (respectively, IJ − n) party P 1 (respectively, P 2 ) candidates are elected. For each τ n (n = 1, . . . , IJ) there is a unique τ j i for some district i and candidate j for which τ n = τ j i . Analogously to the single-district case, we also let τ IJ+1 = 1. It is clear that for all n, τ n+1 ≥ τ n , or equivalently that the number of seats won by P 1 is increasing in τ . The set T induces a distribution over the number of seats won by party P 1 , where F (τ n ) is the probability that P 1 wins at most n seats. The probability of attaining a majority is simply 1 − F (τ M ), and the expected number of seats Figure 1 illustrates district-and nation-wide tide cutpoints.
[ Figure 1 here.]
The derivation of an equilibrium is simplified by the observation that groups not associated with incapacitated legislators (and hence do not write contracts) maximize their candidate's vote share by supporting their candidate. This strictly increases both their candidate's probability of attaining office, as well as the size of their party's coalition. According to our assumptions on r(·), this implies a higher expected level of transfers in period 2, and hence all such groups have a weakly dominant strategy of supporting their candidate; g * pij = 1.
A Baseline -No Incapacitation
Suppose first that γ = 0, so that no legislator is incapacitated. This allows us to isolate the effects of the election on future legislative outcomes. Since groups do not withhold support for their candidates, neither party has any incentive to propose a positive set-aside allocation, and hence y * p = 0. Thus in the bargaining process legislators receive the ex ante expected transfer levels given by (1) in both periods. Depending on the realization of τ , the size and identity of the majority party may change, and so an incumbent legislator in party P 1 with tide cutpoint τ n has an expected payoff of:
The first two terms of (2) represent the transfers expected in period 1. The third term is the expected share of period 2 transfers that is independent of party size. This is simply each legislator's vote share in the legislator, multiplied by the probability of election. The final term is the expected impact of majority size, as higher realizations of τ will result in higher shares of the "bonus" r(·). Since this term would be affected by the withholding of support by a group for a party's candidate, it will figure prominently in the subsequent discussion.
Main Result
To build intuition, we first present a simple example. Consider a four-member district, and suppose that one party P 1 legislator incapacitated in some district i, where
Let her associated group be G 1i1 ; i.e., the group with the largest population under its control. Finally, let the distribution of the partisan tide be uniform, so that F (τ ) = τ .
We look for a voting contract between the group and the party that maximizes the setaside transfer allocation y 1i1 such that the party would be willing to designate exactly y 1i1 in y 1 . In return the group will choose g 1i1 = 1. To derive the value of the set-aside, suppose that the group chooses g 1i1 = 0. What effect does this have on the number of seats that party P 1 wins in the election? Since the votes of the "unaffiliated" population are divided evenly amongst candidates within each party, candidate C 1i1 must receive the lowest vote total in party P 1 . This induces a new set of tide cutpoints T i = {τ j i }. The value of τ that was once able to secure two seats, τ i would exist in (0, 1) only if P 2 were very weak in district 1 (i.e., (ρ 0 i + βρ 1i1 )/4 > ρ 2i1 ), and τ were large enough so that C 1i1 could win on the strength of a strong tide alone.
Suppose that τ 4 i = 1, so that party P 1 cannot win four seats in the district. The following table summarizes the old and new probability distributions over P 1 's seats won. 
From the table, it is clear that there is only one case in which party P 1 does not do worse.
For τ < τ 1 i , it wins zero seats in both worlds. Otherwise, for any draw of τ P 1 loses one seat when G 1i1 withholds support. In expectation, this results in one fewer seat for party P 1 with probability 1 − τ 1 i . Observe that since the candidate in question is the strongest in the district, this is the maximum amount by which P 1 can be hurt.
This reduction in expected seats has two effects on the amount and distribution of P 1 's transfers in the second legislative session. First, there is a 'linear' reduction from expecting (1 − τ 1 i )/(IJ) less in transfers from the non-majority portion of the dollar. This expression simply reflects P 1 's expected loss of 1 − τ 1 i seats and does not affect the party's per capita allocation. Second, there is an increased probability of losing the per capita bonus from majority party status. When all party P 1 groups supported their candidates, the probability of becoming a majority was 1 − τ µ . Now the threshold of τ µ is no longer sufficient if τ
since this implies that fewer than µ seats will be won for τ ∈ [τ µ , τ µ+1 ) when G 1i1 withholds support. Instead, P 1 would need τ > τ µ+1 for a majority. Hence the probability of winning a majority is reduced by τ µ+1 − τ µ . P 1 's total loss in expected utility therefore depends on the location of τ 1 i . In this case, the loss of G 1i1 's support affects P 1 's ability to build a majority. By contrast, if τ
then P 1 would achieve a majority before C 1i1 could be elected. This district is electorally unfavorable to P 1 , and the loss of G 1i1 's support does not affect P 1 's chances of attaining a majority. However, legislators in P 1 may still lose some utility because the per capita benefit of a majority is increasing in the coalition's size.
We assume for the remainder of this example that τ 1 i < τ µ . Consider the incentives of the surviving members of party P 1 . Since there are no other incapacitations, all other groups support their candidates in the election. Thus if G 1i1 withholds its support of C 1i1 , then each surviving legislator in party P 1 will lose an expected share of the majority "bonus" r(·).
She will not lose any "non-majority" benefits, since G 1i1 's support does not affect her chance of election and C 1i1 's presence in the second legislative session does not affect her expected share of the non-majority dollar. Aggregating over possible realizations of τ , the expected period 2 loss for a surviving P 1 member with tide cutpoint τ n is then:
Note that there is no expected loss in the event that τ < τ µ , since the majority "bonus" r(·) in this region is zero. As a result, (3) is constant for all legislators with τ n < τ µ .
Expression (3) identifies the per capita amount that each legislator is willing to lose in pork in period 1. This expected loss is weakly decreasing in n; that is, members representing "weak" districts have less to lose because their chances of being elected into the second legislature are low. The aggregate amount that G 1i1 can demand is then determined by the median of these values, multiplied by m 1 −1 since party members expect equal ex ante shares of pork. The median surviving member of P 1 must satisfy τ n ≤ τ M , and so a majority of P 1 members would vote in favor of a set-aside allocation that promises the following to G 1i1 :
G 1i1 's optimal voting contract therefore forces the median P 1 survivor to be indifferent between (i) setting aside y * 1ij for the group and bargaining over a smaller pie in the first session, and (ii) bargaining over the entire party pie in the first session and risking a smaller pie in the second. Thus the group is able to prevent party members from completely appropriating the transfers that the incapacitated legislator would have enjoyed. Note that the group's ability to commit to this voting scheme is critical, as it would have simply supported its candidate in a setting without commitment.
The amount of transfers that the group can recover depends on the functional form of r(·). If r(·) is sufficiently high, then an electorally influential group such as G 1i1 may even receive more in the first legislative session than it would have expected in the presence of its legislator. This can happen because the set-aside y * 1ij does not depend on P 1 's majority status, but rather its future electoral prospects. Thus if P 1 is the minority party and τ M is low, then it will have relatively little to allocate among its members in period 1 but high expectations of future transfers. While a group such as G 1i1 can extract a great deal in this environment, such circumstances are probably unlikely in practice.
We can generalize this logic straightforwardly to the general game to reach the main result on the effect of no representation. The comparative statics result links the electoral influence of a group to the amount that its constituents can expect if its legislator becomes incapacitated. Sufficiency is guaranteed by a very mild condition on the competitiveness of the district of the incapacitated legislator. Specifically, we require that the new tide cutpoint τ θ required to elect the J-th candidate in a district when one group withholds support be somewhat harder to reach than the median tide cutpoint τ µ .
12 This implies that a party cannot be so strong that it would win all J seats with even an incapacitated legislator and a moderate τ . This extreme case may occur only when the opposing party's largest group is small relative to the measure of unaffiliated voters ρ 0 i . We note without proof that the result often holds even in the absence of this requirement.
) is weakly decreasing in j for incapacitated legislator C 1ij (C 2ij ).
Proof. See Appendix.
The implication of Proposition 1 is that we would expect larger drops in pork spending where incapacitated legislators are backed by "weak" constituency groups. Importantly, it suggests that legislative constituents and their implicit bargaining power play a central role in determining legislative transfers. This contrasts with a substantial literature on distributive politics (e.g., Chari, Jones and Marimon, 1997; Baron and Diermeier, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno, 2002) in which the electorate assumes the less direct role of selecting legislator types.
It is finally worth noting that our assumptions on r(·) have two non-trivial effects. First, the comparative statics will typically not be linear in ρ pij . Within a party, the ability to influence majority status confers a "jump" in per capita benefits. Large groups will generally be able to claim uniformly large set-asides, due to their influence on attaining majority status, while smaller groups receive less. Second, even electorally weak groups receive positive benefits, because the per capita majority bonus implied by r(·) is increasing in party size. One can imagine instead that majority status instead confers a fixed benefit r to the party. This would imply that beyond a minimum majority coalition, the per capita benefit of majority status would actually decline. In this environment, a group may not be able to extract anything from the party unless it were essential for achieving a majority. The result under this assumption would be similar, though considerably more cumbersome. 14 This role for legislators is often part of the explanation for why Japanese politics is so candidatecentered and why the LDP has been able to control the Diet. 15 However, the empirical evidence that legislators have much influence over these central-to-municipality transfers is mixed.
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13 We can also achieve similar but in some cases locally non-monotonic results by assuming that r(µ t p ) is positive for µ t p < 1/2. 14 In describing the activities of former prime minister Nakasone, Thayer (1969, p. 94 ) writes "Nakasone is called upon by the towns and villages to assist them in obtaining funds from the government for the construction of new facilities or the repair of existing facilities . . . . Each of these projects in the countryside stands as concrete testimony of the effectiveness of Nakasone as a member of the Diet. The secretaries are not at all hesitant about pointing these landmarks out."
15 Scheiner (2006) argues that pork distribution is the main explanation for the LDP's control over the Japanese government.
16 A number of studies that correlate transfers with the share of seats held by the LDP in a particular region suggest that each additional LDP politician affects the allocation of transfers. Doi (2001) finds a positive correlation between transfers aggregated at the prefectural level and the LDP's share of Lower House Seats in a prefecture. Meyer and Naka (1998) also find a positive correlation between transfers and LDP seat share
Understanding the role of individual representatives in the distribution of transfers in
Japan is complicated by two features of Japanese politics relevant to the period of our analysis (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) : i) the electoral institutions; and ii) the political party system. During this period members of Japan's Lower House were elected by a multi-member district single non-transferable vote system. Under this system between two and six Lower House members were elected from each district. Voters were given one non-transferable vote -i.e. a vote that is cast for one specific candidate. Thus, under this system parties who wished to control the government had to be concerned with coordinating the votes among co-partisans competing in the same district.
During the period of our study, Japan's Lower House was controlled by the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP was considered to be the most conservative of the major parties during this period.
17 Its leaders may have influenced the distribution of public expenditures to maximize the interests of the party as a whole and not necessarily those of any particular member (e.g. McCubbins and Noble, 1995) .
Although cohesive voting blocs tied to specific candidates are a well known feature of Japanese politics, to our knowledge, no one has examined whether the "strength" of these groups may be linked to the distribution of public expenditures. The model provides a clear intuition for this link. In this section we test Proposition 1 by examining whether the variation in a group's ability to secure a legislative seat is correlated with changes in targeted transfers when the group loses its representative.
Japanese Politics
To identify the relationship between legislators and government transfers we exploit three characteristics of Japanese politics during the relevant period: i) constituencies exogenously losing legislative representatives; ii) organized groups supporting candidates; and iii) politicized distribution of targeted transfers. With a panel data set including measures of these at the national level. However, Horiuchi and Saito (2003) find a negative relationship between transfers and seat shares using municipality level data. Hirano (2006b) finds no change in transfers after LDP candidates who pass away while in office. 17 The main opposition parties included the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Clean Government Party (CGP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). characteristics we are able to identify whether changes in transfers following a loss of a representative is related to whether the group supporting the representative has a strong record for securing a seat in the legislature. In this subsection we discuss each of these three characteristics and how they will be measured.
Exogenous Shocks to Representation: Deceased Diet Members
Under the multi-member district single non-transferable vote electoral system, districts that lost a representative would not necessarily have the representative replaced. Representatives who passed away would only be replaced if they died shortly after being elected or if more than one member passed away in the district.
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The data on legislators' deaths was gathered from various issues of the Seiji Handobukku, One factor that we need to be concerned with is the degree to which the deceased legislator resembles the remaining Diet members. Table 1 compares the deceased Diet members to the general population of Japanese legislators at that time. The deceased LDP Diet members are older than the average Diet member but are younger than the average retiring LDP member.
Also LDP members who pass away in office tend to be more senior than the average Diet member but less senior than the average retiring representative. The deceased legislators appear to be passing away approximately one legislative session before they would normally retire. Perhaps most importantly, the age of LDP Diet members who pass away in office is still younger than the average life expectancy for a Japanese male during this period.
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Another concern is that the deaths may not be exogenous. Table 2 lists the causes of death 18 A few papers have also used the passing of politicians as an exogenous shock to estimate the effect of representation on public policy (Jones and Olken, 2005; Roberts 1990 ). Jones and Olken (2005) examine how the death of leaders affected national economic conditions. Roberts (1990) examines how the death of senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson affected the stock prices of companies related to his home state of Washington. However, this is the first paper that uses the death of legislators to estimate the impact of representatives on public expenditures.
19 According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare the average life expectancy for a Japanese male was 71.7 in 1975, 74.8 in 1985, and 76.4 in 1995. for the Diet members between 1970 and 1995. With the possible exception of suicide/murder and heart failure/heart attack most of the causes of death are presumably uncorrelated with policy decisions. The initial findings of no association between losing a representative and government transfers do not appear to be significantly affected by excluding these potentially endogenous cases (Hirano, 2006b ).
Groups Attached to Candidates: Jiban
Under Japan's multi-member district single non-transferable vote electoral system, Japanese politicians' electoral support tended to be concentrated in bailiwicks known as jiban. The multi-member district system is known to provide strong incentives for candidates to focus on narrow sub-constituencies within the districts (e.g. Myerson, 1993) . This was especially true of candidates who were competing against co-partisans in the same district (e.g. Hirano, 2006a). Candidate-specific jiban were important in helping to divide votes among co-partisans.
LDP candidates' jiban tended to be geographically concentrated around candidates' hometowns (e.g., Hirano, 2006a) .
20 Highly organized personal support organizations, known as koenkai, were in charge of maintaining the candidate's support in the jiban (e.g., Bouissou, 1999; Curtis, 1976) . Koenkai often have contacts in each municipality who are responsible for their candidate's electoral support from that municipality. Although jiban existed to support specific politicians, in many cases jiban support was passed along to successive candidates either as a whole or in parts. 21 Conventional wisdom is that Japanese legislators cultivate support in their jiban by providing constituency services and by acting as a "pipeline" to the national treasury (e.g. Fukui and Fukai, 1996) .
22
20 Of course not all jiban were geographically oriented. Some were policy oriented (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; Tatebayashi, 2004) .
21 Curtis (1976, pp. 49-50) writes, "When Sato entered the Prefectural Assembly he "inherited" the jiban of Aragane Keiji and when he left he "transferred" it to his chosen successor Shuto Kenji . . . It is is implicit in such procedures that the supporters of a politician have a loyalty to that politician which takes precedence over personal feelings toward the new candidate they are being asked to support, and that they will be able to deliver their "hard votes" to the candidate of their choice."
22 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995, pp. 8-9) write, "To even out its votes, the LDP uses its control over government to build its candidates' personal support networks. LDP candidates foster these networks through a combination of government dispensed 'pork', cash, and in-kind gifts, as well as bureaucratic intervention services."
We are primarily interested in the variation in the ability of jiban to increase the probability of a specific candidate being elected. We consider a jiban to be "strong" if it has a good track record for winning elections. Jiban are classified as being "weak" when its candidates lose an election or receive the fewest votes among the elected candidates more than once in the 10 years before or after the legislator passes away. We also only focus on jiban that support multiple candidates across time, which by definition are organizations that are not candidate-specific. Without variation in jiban candidates it is difficult to separate jiban strength from candidate-specific popularity, which of course may be related. Jiban may support only one candidate for multiple reasons: i) the jiban does not publicly specify a clear successor; ii) the jiban is "weak"; iii) the jiban may divide its support among several candidates. We also consider jiban to be weak if they are passed on but survive for less than five years.
Jiban are identified using Steven Reed's data set of district-level electoral returns for the Japanese Lower House which includes an indicator variable for candidates' jiban affiliations. Table 3 compares the correlation in the municipality vote shares for candidates from the same versus different jiban. Candidates from the same jiban should have their votes highly correlated over time, especially relative to the other candidates who do not share the same jiban. This appears to be the case. Even when a new candidate inherits the support of a jiban his/her support is highly correlated with the vote shares of the candidate who was previously supported by the jiban. In fact the correlation is much higher than average of the highest correlation among co-partisans in the same district from different jiban. As we expected, the correlation in municipality vote share between candidates sharing a "weak" jiban is lower than the correlation between candidates sharing a "strong" jiban. Figure 1 provides an electoral map of two different candidates who share the same jiban.
We identify the location of a candidate's jiban using their municipality level vote share in the election prior to their passing away. The vote share threshold to qualify as being part of a jiban depends upon the magnitude of the district. In the five-and six-member districts a municipality is considered to be part of a candidate's jiban if she receives more than 20% of the vote. In the three-and four-member districts the threshold for being part of a jiban is 30% and 25% respectively.
One concern is that the jiban may differ along some other dimension not related to the probability of securing a seat for the legislator. The "weak" jiban tend to include municipalities that are poorer, have more employees in first tier industries, and smaller populations than the "strong" jiban. This is not surprising since having municipalities with larger populations as part of one's jiban will secure more votes. Further research should attempt to explain the determinants of jiban strength, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Politicized Government Transfers: Kokko Shishutsukin
Conventional wisdom among Japan scholars is that transfers from the national to local governments are highly politicized. As Curtis (1992, p. 229) This study focuses on the allocation of central-to-municipality government transfers between 1977 and 1992, during which time there were five elections for the Lower House of the Japanese Diet (1979, 1980, 1983, 1986 and 1990) . 24 These central-to-locality transfers make up a large amount of total government expenditures. Roughly 60% of general tax revenue goes to the national government and 40% goes to the local government. However, roughly 60% of government expenditures are at the local level and 40% are at the national level (Shirai, 2005) .
25
About 90% of central government grants are transferred to localities in the form of chiho kofuzei (local allocation tax or LAT) or kokko shishutsukin (national treasury disbursements).
The LAT is an unconditional, or non-earmarked, grant given to localities according to a formula based on the localities' needs. The national treasury disbursements are conditional grants distributed by the central government which are used to fund several types of programs including compulsory education, disaster relief, health and welfare, and construction.
We focus primarily on the national treasury disbursements since the popular perception is that these transfers are more likely to be politicized. 26 Previous studies find some evidence that representatives of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have substantial influence on national treasury disbursements (Doi, 2001; Kobayashi, 1991) . LAT has traditionally been perceived as being less open to political intervention on a year-to-year basis since it is based on a formula. Thus, we should not observe a change in LAT allocations after a legislator passes away. These data come from the Nikkei NEEDS Database.
Specification
The basic specification is as follows:
where S iemt is per capita central-to-local government transfers directed to district i, municipality m and year t of legislative session e. D iet−1 is an indicator variable for whether representative j in district i passes away at time t − 1 of legislative session e. 27 J iem is an indicator variable for whether municipality m is part of the deceased incumbent's core support area (i.e. jiban) in the election to legislative session e. W ie is an indicator variable for whether the jiban of deceased incumbent in district i of legislative session e was "weak."
Since death is assumed to be exogenous, it is uncorrelated with observable and nonobservable factors that may potentially influence both government transfers and electoral outcomes. Also since we are looking at the changes within legislative sessions, we can identify the general effect of losing a legislator, without assuming that LDP and non-LDP incumbents have different effects on public expenditures. We also interact D iet−1 with a 26 Yonehara (1993, p. 176) writes, "Most of the national specific-purpose disbursements are allocated among local governments at the discretion of the national government, there are only a few formula disbursements. Therefore, every local government seeks to obtain specific-purpose disbursements to the maximum extent possible."
27 We assume that legislators influence the subsidies distributed in period t through their activities at time t − 1.
variable indicating the partisan affiliation of the candidates to determine whether the LDP candidates have greater influence over the distribution of public expenditures as popularly perceived.
The municipality level fixed effect, α iem , varies by legislative session. This takes into account municipality and district characteristics that influence transfers but do not vary substantially between elections. Allowing fixed-effects to vary in this way should also take into account political changes that occur following each election, such as the partisan composition and seniority of the district's representatives. 28 The estimated effects are identified with only a subset of these observations since those who pass away just before an election year do not provide any additional information for the analysis.
29
One concern is the potential connection between the measure of jiban strength and public expenditures since jiban strength is a function of electoral outcomes. Thus, we exclude the electoral outcome for the first election after a legislator passes away when calculating jiban strength.
30
We also include an indicator variable for whether the jiban was never passed on. As discussed above there are multiple reasons why a jiban may not be passed along across candidates. These jiban are most likely a mixture of "strong" and "weak" jiban.
We also include four additional covariates that are commonly included in analyses of Japanese government transfers: i) the proportion of the work force engaged in first-tier industries; ii) the proportion of the population considered to be dependent; iii) the income per capita; iv) the fiscal strength of the municipality (required revenue/required expenditures).
These data also come from the Nikkei NEEDS database.
31
28 There is an issue of what year the fixed effect should start for each legislative session. Since the fiscal years start on April 1, the negotiations for the budget begin as far back as the summer in the previous fiscal year and budgets are submitted to the Diet in the few months before the March 31 deadline. Several supplemental budgets are introduced as late as the fall of the fiscal year. Thus, if an election occurred after October of fiscal year t, the newly elected representatives are assumed to affect the public expenditures in fiscal year t + 1.
29 The analysis presented in this paper makes a strict assumption that any impact of a deceased legislator in legislative session e will disappear in the election year to legislative session e + 1. The assumption is that the newly elected representatives will immediately be able to compensate for the previous absence of a representative. The results do not appear to be sensitive to relaxing this assumption. 30 We also attempt to avoid this problem by measuring jiban strength only using elections prior to when the legislator passes away. This measure yields substantively similar findings.
31 The first three variables should not be available on a year-to-year basis but rather on a 5-year basis.
Results
The results are presented in Table 4 . The results in the first column provide no statistically significant evidence that on average national treasury disbursements to either LDP or non-LDP jiban declined after the jiban's representative passed away. As expected there is no evidence that LAT are affected by losing a representative. This is consistent with Hirano (2006b).
The second and third columns provide evidence that LDP legislators supported by "weak"
jiban have a statistically significant decline in national treasury disbursements. On average
there is approximately a 9 percent decline in the targeted transfers. However, there is no similar statistically significant decline in LAT to deceased legislators supported by "weak"
jiban. The lack of association between deceased LDP legislators and LAT is what we expect given the common perception that LAT allocations are more closely tied to a formula.
One potential concern is that we may not be able to separate the effects of effort versus group strength. Candidates with "weak" jiban may simply be exerting more effort. While this explanation is possible, we find it less plausible since the legislators supported by "strong"
jiban would have to be exerting no effort on behalf of their constituents but still receiving the jiban support. Furthermore, we might expect the candidates who came in last place in the election before passing away to have the strongest incentive to exert effort. Including an indicator variable for the core area of last place winners who pass away is negative but not statistically significant when the "weak" jiban indicator is also included. The "weak" jiban indicator remains statistically significant.
Conclusions
This is the first paper, to our knowledge, that provides a theoretical framework and empirical evidence for examining the relationship between constituency groups, legislators and the allocation of government transfers.
The above discussion suggests that when constituency groups are linked to specific candidates, the interests of these groups may still be represented even without formal representation in the legislature. However, this is not necessarily true for all groups. The groups
Our understanding is the Nikkei NEEDS database simply linearly imputes the missing years.
that could potentially influence which political party gains a majority of legislative seats will be highly valued by the parties. Representation of these groups' interests appear to be less dependent whether they have an elected representative physically present in the legislature.
Our findings suggest that the presence of informal structures within the electorate, such as jiban, can have welfare implications. While these structures have long been known to exist in Japan, there has been little evidence to link these structures to policy outcomes.
An open research question which we do not address in this paper is why these jiban exist and what explains the variation in their "strength." Both our theoretical model and empirical analysis assume that jiban strength is exogenously determined. While previous research suggests the presence of Japan's geographically based jiban may be linked to its electoral institutions (Hirano, 2006a) , there is little explanation for why jiban "strength"
should vary within Japan. We suspect that certain demographic, geographic, or institutional characteristics that may provide stronger incentives for constituents to form groups and for politicians to help maintain the groups.
Another related research question we hope to examine is whether a similar relationship between constituency groups and representation exists in other political contexts and/or other policy areas. Although Japan's political and public finance system between 1977 and 1992 provides a unique framework for testing our claims, the predictions from the theoretical model should potentially applicable for understanding representation in other candidate centered electoral systems and in other policy areas.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, we focus on legislators in party P 1 and assume that a party P 1 legislator occupying the j-th seat in district i with tide
Thus the group backing this legislator is G 1ij . Note that if g 1ij = 0 for any legislator j in district i, then the tide cutpoint for the corresponding election candidate C 1ij in the subsequent election is some τ
We adopt the following notation. For each party P p , let k p denote its number of incapacitations. Let v = 1/(IJ) and v = 1/(IJ − k 1 − k 2 ) denote each legislator's vote share in the pre-incapacitation and post-incapacitation legislature, respectively. Finally, to help keep track of the number of legislators if G 1ij withholds support for C 1ij , define the following for any integer k:
Consider first each group's voting strategy. As noted in the text, groups without incapacitated legislators have a weakly dominant strategy of supporting their candidate. For incapacitated legislators, we derive the voting contract that induces the maximum payment from P 1 to G 1ij in y 1 . To do this, we find the maximum set-aside allocation y 1 that a majority of non-incapacitated P 1 legislators would support.
Suppose that all P 2 groups offer support to their candidates. Consider a party P 1 legislator with tide cutpoint τ n . There are three cases. First, if n ≤ θ − 1, the expected utility of this legislator if G 1ij withholds support is:
Second, if n = θ, the expected utility of this legislator if G 1ij withholds support is:
Third, if n > θ, the expected utility of this legislator if G 1ij withholds support is:
Likewise, if P 1 proposes a set-aside allocation of y(n) to G 1ij and all P 1 groups provide support, then we can modify (2), to express each surviving legislator's expected utility as:
Taking the difference, a P 1 legislator with tide cutpoint τ n is indifferent between the two expected payoffs if the set-aside y(n) allocated to G 1ij in y 1 satisfies:
(F (τ 
We now use (6) to determine the maximum set-aside that would gain majority support among non-incapacitated P 1 legislators. Observe that for n ≤ θ − 1, y(n) depends on n only through the summation limit. Since each term of the summation is non-negative, y(n) must be weakly decreasing in n. Additionally, since (F (τ is also non-negative, we have y(n) is weakly decreasing in n. Let n med denote the index such that τ n med is the (m 1 + 1)/2-th (for m 1 odd) or m 1 /2-th (for m 1 even) largest value of τ n in {τ 1 , . . . , τ m 1 } \ {τ d }. Note that since k 1 < 1, n med ≤ µ + 1. By the assumption that θ > µ + 1, this implies n ≤ θ − 1 for n = 1, . . . , n med . By (6) and the fact that r(µ t p ) = 0 for µ t p ≤ 1/2, we then have y(1) = y(2) = · · · = y(n med ).
To establish the equilibrium set-aside and voting strategies, observe that a majority of non-incapacitated party P 1 legislators will vote in favor of any set-aside proposal satisfying y 1ij ≤ min{y(n med ), (m 1 −1)v +r((m 1 −1)v )}, if that proposal assures that g 1ij = 1. G 1ij = 1 therefore optimally offers g 1ij = 1 iff y 1ij ≥ min{y(n med ), (m 1 − 1)v + r((m 1 − 1)v )}. P 1 therefore proposes y * 1 with: y * 1ij = min{y(n med ), (m 1 −1)v + r((m 1 −1)v )} and y 1j n = 0 for all (j , n ) = (j, n).
Expression (6) implies that legislators with tide cutpoints τ 1 , . . . , τ n med prefer y * 1 to y 1 = 0. Therefore, y * 1 passes and all P 1 groups support their candidates. By symmetry, all P 2 groups support their candidates when all P 1 groups support their candidates, and thus there is a sequential equilibrium in which all g pij = 1 for all groups.
We now examine comparative statics on y * 1ij . Clearly, within district i, d is increasing in j. Note that in the first case of (6), the first term is independent of d, and each term of the summation is weakly decreasing in d. Thus y(n) is weakly decreasing in d for all n = 1, . . . , n med . This implies that y(n med ) is weakly decreasing in d as well. Therefore y * 1ij
is weakly decreasing in j for incapacitated legislator C 1ij within district i. 
Tide is sufficient to elect:
• Two party P 1 legislators in district i • Four party P 1 legislators nationally (a minority)
District i (3 seats) Nation (3 districts)
Figure 1: District and National Tide Cutpoints. The distribution of voters and group strengths across districts induces values of the national electoral tide τ that are necessary for the election of each candidate. This figure illustrates a nation with three three-member districts, and assumes that each group supports its candidate. The illustrated tide is sufficient to elect two party P 1 legislators in district i, and four party P 1 legislators nationally.
